The following post is by Gavin Healy, a public school parent and a
newly-elected member of CEC2. Though ostensibly, all new for-profit
charter schools are banned from opening in NYC, there are still ways to make a
buck off the proliferation of charters, especially as NY State law requires the
city to reimburse charter schools for the cost of its leases at a very generous
rate, one that it appears many charter schools including those whose management
organizations own their own buildings have used to their advantage in many
cases to inflate their own rent. See the Class Size Matters 2019 and 2021 reports
on this issue, and the letter from Senators John Liu, Robert Jackson and CM
Rita Joseph asking the City Comptroller to audit these payments.
Now that some charter schools are closing due to falling enrollment, such
Harlem Hebrew
Language Academy, they can sell off their buildings or rent them
back to DOE, and garner even higher profits, despite the fact that the
city has already spent nearly nine million dollars on lease payments in the
case of HHLA over the years.
Here Gavin reports on how Barone Management, which is in the process of
building and managing a portfolio of 10 charter school buildings
throughout the city, mostly in the Bronx, promises a steady rate of 22.5%
internal rate of return (IRR) to its investors. What Barone explained below is
that the per student amount set by the state and received from the city in rent
doesn't align with the actual cost of the land, construction or maintenance;
thus building charter schools in less expensive areas of the city like the
Bronx guarantees a higher profit to investors.
Thanks to Tanesha Grant, who first noticed this ad on Facebook.
Recently, I came across an
ad seeking “investors” for the Bronx Charter School for Children, and
immediately the question popped into my head: How can a NYC charter school have
“investors” when for-profit charter schools are now prohibited under New York
State law?
Nationally, approximately
12% of charter schools are run by for-profit management companies. In New York State,
charter schools had once been permitted to contract with for-profit operators,
but the state legislature closed
that loophole in 2010, and now only six for-profit charter schools
remain in New York (four of them in NYC), grandfathered under the previous
version of the law. Bronx Charter School for Children is not one of them.
So how can a “non-profit”
NYC charter school be sold to investors? The answer to that question lies in
what drives much of NYC politics: real estate.
The developer of this real
estate project is a firm called Barone Management. Barone boasts of an “educational
portfolio” of a dozen charter schools in NYC with close to 6,000
students, plus several more schools in development. For the Bronx Charter
School for Children, Barone is renovating an existing building into a 28,000
square foot school.
To partially finance the ground lease and renovation of the
building, Barone is seeking investors through a “crowdfunding” platform called
RealtyMogul, which hosted a webinar
to answer questions about the project. RealtyMogul and Barone structured
this project as a private placement of shares in a limited liability company
established to lease the building to the (non-profit) charter school operator.
As a private placement, shares can be sold to “accredited investors”
(generally, people with a net worth of $1 million or more) without registration
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Bronx Charter School for
Children is Barone’s second “crowdfunded” charter school project in NYC,
following one it completed for the Renaissance Charter School in Elmhurst,
Queens in 2020.
In its webinar for
potential investors, Barone offered a primer on the economics of what’s driving
charter school demand in NYC. As Barone’s chief executive put it, “the NOI [net
operating income] only grows as more students are enrolled.” Unlike payments under
a more traditional commercial lease, which might be calculated on a simple
dollars per square foot basis, total lease payments for this charter school
depend on overall student enrollment. NYC is the only school district in the
nation obligated to provide charter schools with rental subsidies, and this
fact is a key element in Barone’s marketing pitch to investors.
In the words of
Barone Management CEO Scott Barone:
“How does per pupil funding translate to
real estate? Per New York City State and City charter regulations, 30% of an
individual charter school’s per pupil funding is permitted to be spent on its
real estate and facility needs. For the ‘23-24 school year, this equated to
$5,502 per child per year. So, the short answer is that the more students you
have enrolled in a particular school, the more robust its overall budget is,
including its real estate budget, which is referred to as rental assistance in
New York City.”
“Rental
assistance” refers to payments NYC is required to make to charter
schools established after 2014, or charter schools operating before that time
that have since expanded, if such schools are located in buildings not owned by
the NYC Department of Education. When the NYS legislature amended the charter
law in 2014, it imposed the requirement to pay rental assistance only in
respect of charter schools located in NYC and in no other school district in
the state. As Barone notes, the amount NYC is required to pay to charter
schools for rental assistance is $5,502 per student for the upcoming school
year, a per student amount that has more than doubled since 2014.
The Bronx Charter School
for Children, established before the 2014 amendment, had not been able to take
advantage of rental assistance until it expanded from a K-5 to a K-8 school
starting from the 2020-2021 school year. The new location for the school will
house these expanded middle school grades.
The amount of “rental
assistance” due under the law is the “actual rental cost” of the charter
school’s lease or 30% of per pupil funding, whichever is lower. In its pitch to
investors, Barone is clearly setting the expectation that the amount of rent
they will charge the charter school is the highest amount possible - 30% of per
pupil funding - regardless of the actual rental cost. As the private placement
memorandum provides, the base rent due under the charter school lease will
initially be an amount equal to “(A) the greater of: (i) 30% of the Tenant
School’s per pupil funding from New York State for the first Lease Year” and
“(ii) $5,284.69; multiplied by (B) the Student Count.”
The lease terms provide
that the rent will increase by a minimum of 2.25% per year, plus a
corresponding increase in that amount as student enrollment increases. Since
“Student Count” is defined under the lease as the greater of the school’s
actual enrollment and minimum enrollment numbers of 189 students in the first
year, 200 students in the second, 213 students in the third, and 225 students
in the fourth, the profits of Barone and its investors will rise as enrollment
rises. The charter school also has a clear financial incentive to maintain its
enrollment numbers, since if enrollment drops below those minimums, its rental
payment obligations will not decrease.
“Rental assistance” also
explains why investors push for new charter school development in some
neighborhoods rather than others. Responding to questions about crime and
security around the school, Barone emphasized the presence of NYPD school
safety officers, but ultimately turned the answer back to real estate
economics, saying: “from a real estate perspective, for real estate dollars
associated with a charter school, we get $5,500 per kid per year in rent. … I
get that same $5,500 in the South Bronx that I would on Park Avenue. Obviously,
the cost of my real estate is far cheaper in the South Bronx.”
Barone’s investment sales
pitch is indicative of how charter schools can blur the line between the
non-profit and for-profit education sectors. Barone’s chief financial officer
projected total returns on a $100,000 investment in the school to be over
$219,000 over the course of four years, and hinted at the potential for selling
the project in its entirety to other investors at a later point. As an example,
he cited how in 2019 “a large
package of charter schools was sold … for over $450 million,” referring to the sale
by a real estate investment trust of a portfolio of close to 50 facilities
leased to a charter school operator. In that case, as with the Bronx Charter
School for Children, it was buildings being sold rather than schools, but that
distinction gets lost in the sales pitch to investors. In the real estate
economics of the charter sector, schools are assets and greater student
enrollment equates to a higher return on investment. NYC rental assistance
guarantees these returns, and it also drives investor demand for charters in
the South Bronx rather than on Park Avenue.